The Passport Lottery

How Birth, Wealth and Borders Divide the World’s Freedom to Move

I. Two Passports, Two Worlds

A Singaporean passport offered access to 192 destinations without a visa in advance in the July 2026 update of the Henley Passport Index. An Afghan passport offered access to 22, down from 24 in the January 2026 edition [1]. The difference is not a measure of either traveller’s character, resources or intentions. It is a measure of how nationality shapes the permission to cross a border.

For one traveller, a short trip may require little more than a valid passport and a booking. Another may need to assemble financial records, secure an appointment, pay non-refundable fees and wait for a decision before making the same journey. The requirements vary by destination and visa category, but the burden is not distributed evenly.

That disparity is the passport lottery. Citizenship establishes an initial legal position, usually before a person has made any meaningful choices. It can change through descent, naturalisation or other legal processes, but the route to a different status is itself shaped by law, family circumstances, residence and, in some cases, wealth.

The stakes extend beyond holidays. Visa-free entry does not ordinarily confer the right to settle or work (the Henley index itself measures only short-term entry access [1]), while residence permits and citizenship can open different sets of rights. Regional arrangements such as EU free movement go further than ordinary visitor access, but they operate under their own legal conditions.

Passport rankings therefore capture one important dimension of mobility, not the whole of it. This article examines how citizenship by birth establishes an initial advantage, how visa systems regulate access, how lotteries distribute limited migration opportunities, and how investment programmes offer alternative routes to people who can meet their financial requirements. It then considers how restricted mobility intersects with forced displacement, remittances and skilled migration, and closes with the policy directions that could make the system more transparent and accountable.

Dimension	What It Covers	Practical Significance
Short-Term Travel	Visa-free, visa-on-arrival and electronic entry arrangements	Can reduce advance paperwork, fees and uncertainty for short visits.
Residence	Legal permission to live in another country	Determines whether a person can remain beyond the terms of a visit and under what conditions.
Employment	Permission to work under the destination’s immigration and labour rules	Shapes access to jobs, occupations and local labour markets.
Consular Assistance	Assistance that a state may provide to its nationals abroad	Can help with emergencies, travel documents and contact with local authorities, subject to legal and practical limits.
Long-Term Settlement	Routes to permanent residence or citizenship	Determines whether a temporary stay can develop into a more durable legal status.

The scale of the issue is growing. The United Nations Population Division estimated that there were 304 million international migrants worldwide in 2024, compared with 154 million in 1990 [2]. Yet the law on movement across borders is asymmetric. International instruments recognise a right to leave any country, including one’s own, and to return to one’s own country, but they do not create a general right to enter another state [35]. Admission remains governed by national laws and regional agreements.

The Henley Passport Index measures short-term entry access, not the full range of rights associated with citizenship [1]. EU citizenship offers a different form of mobility: subject to EU law, citizens can move to and reside in other member states [11]. The contrast shows why passport rankings are informative but incomplete measures of mobility. To understand why people begin with such unequal access, the analysis must start with the legal status most people acquire before they can choose it: citizenship at birth.

II. The Birthright Gamble

Citizenship is often assigned before a person can influence the outcome. Nationality laws commonly combine two principles: jus soli, under which citizenship may follow from birth in a territory, and jus sanguinis, under which it is transmitted through parentage. Countries vary in how they combine them, including the conditions they impose on parents’ residence, legal status and citizenship.

The resulting differences reach beyond legal identity. Political theorist Joseph Carens has compared birthright citizenship to inherited status in a feudal order, highlighting how nationality can distribute opportunities according to circumstances a person did not choose [4, p. 252]. Branko Milanovic’s research on global inequality highlights how differences in average incomes between countries, and thus location, account for a large share of global income inequality [5]. The two perspectives address different questions: one concerns the fairness of inherited membership, while the other examines how much of global income inequality is associated with where people live.

Comparative nationality-law datasets show that territorial birthright citizenship varies by jurisdiction and may be subject to conditions relating to parental status, residence or the date of birth [3]. The comparison depends on the dataset’s definitions, coverage and date. The country examples below illustrate different legal models; they should not be read as a complete classification of all nationality systems.

Canada: Territorial Birthright and Statutory Exceptions

Canada generally grants citizenship to people born on its territory, regardless of their parents’ immigration status [6]. The Citizenship Act sets out exceptions in section 3(2) for specified children of foreign diplomatic or consular representatives and other persons covered by the statutory provisions on diplomatic privileges and immunities [6]. Canada’s model demonstrates how a broad territorial rule can coexist with narrowly defined statutory exceptions.

Argentina: Territorial Birthright with a Narrow Diplomatic Exception

Argentina grants nationality to people born on its territory whatever the nationality of their parents, with one exception written into Article 1 of Citizenship Law No. 346: the children of foreign ministers and members of a legation resident in the Republic [29]. The same article also treats the children of native-born Argentines who are born abroad and opt for Argentine nationality as Argentine, a descent route that sits alongside the territorial rule [29]. Birthright nationality must be distinguished from naturalisation and from the rules governing loss or renunciation of citizenship. Argentina’s recent attempt to create a naturalisation route based on investment is a separate matter, discussed in Section V.

Germany: Descent and Conditional Birthright Citizenship

Germany historically relied heavily on citizenship by descent. Before the introduction of a conditional territorial-birth rule in 2000, a child born in Germany to foreign parents did not generally acquire German citizenship merely by being born there [9].

Section 4(3) of the German Nationality Act (StAG) now provides for citizenship at birth where a parent meets the applicable residence and residence-status conditions [9]. Under the 2024 modernisation of the Act, the required period of lawful habitual residence by a parent was shortened from eight years to five, and the parent must hold a permanent right of residence [9]. Germany’s rule therefore does not treat territorial birth alone as sufficient in every case: citizenship depends on whether a parent satisfies the statutory conditions applicable at the time of birth.

India: The Statutory Evolution of Birthright Provisions

India’s citizenship-by-birth rules show how a state can narrow or redefine territorial birthright citizenship through legislation. The governing conditions changed over three broad periods, with parental citizenship and the other parent’s legal status becoming increasingly important under the Citizenship Act, 1955 [10]:

• Birth before 1 July 1987 (26 January 1950 to 30 June 1987): Section 3 of the 1955 Act conferred Indian citizenship on any person born in India, irrespective of parental nationality, subject to the exceptions in section 3(2). As that subsection now reads, the exceptions cover a child whose parent has the immunity from suits and legal processes accorded to a foreign envoy and is not an Indian citizen, and a child born in a place under enemy occupation to a parent who is an enemy alien.
• Birth from 1 July 1987 to 2 December 2004: Following legislative amendments in 1986, birth in India conferred citizenship only if at least one parent was an Indian citizen at the time of the child’s birth.
• Birth on or after 3 December 2004: Under amendments enacted in 2003, a person born in India acquires citizenship by birth only if (a) both parents are Indian citizens, or (b) one parent is an Indian citizen and the other parent is not classified as an “illegal migrant” at the time of birth.

The present framework makes parental citizenship and the other parent’s legal classification central to eligibility. The precise outcome depends on the statutory provisions applicable on the date of birth. India’s statutory changes show that territorial birthright citizenship can narrow over time as lawmakers redefine the role of parental status.

III. The World Behind the Visa Desk

Birthplace and parentage can establish a person’s initial citizenship, but they do not determine every border outcome. For people whose passports do not provide visa-waiver access to a destination, entry may depend on an application process involving documents, fees, appointments and an official decision. The requirements vary by destination and visa category, but they can impose substantial costs before a journey begins.

Governments justify screening through concerns about eligibility, identity, security, overstays and the ability of visitors to support themselves. Applicants bear the other side of that system: fees may be non-refundable, processing times uncertain and appointments costly to reach. Those burdens matter even when the intended trip is temporary, whether for family, study, business or an event.

The European Union: Free Movement Versus External Borders

Under Article 21 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Directive 2004/38/EC, EU citizens have rights to move and reside in other member states, subject to the conditions and limits laid down in EU law [11].

• Initial Residence: EU citizens generally have a right to reside in another member state for up to three months with a valid identity card or passport, subject to the directive’s applicable conditions [11].
• Residence Beyond Three Months: The right to remain longer depends on the person’s circumstances and the relevant statutory conditions, including those applicable to workers, self-employed people, students and people with sufficient resources [11].
• Permanent Residence: Qualifying EU citizens generally acquire a right of permanent residence after five years of continuous legal residence, subject to the directive’s provisions and exceptions [11].

EU free movement illustrates the difference between permission to visit and a legal right to reside, with the latter governed by conditions set out in EU law.

Employment-Based Immigration and Selection Systems

Long-term immigration is governed by rules that differ sharply from short-term travel privileges. Some countries rank applicants using points; others rely on employer sponsorship, statutory preference categories, quotas or priority dates. A passport that makes a holiday easier does not necessarily improve an applicant’s position under these systems.

The United States shows how the birth lottery operates inside the system itself, through a queue rather than a ballot. Employment-based green cards are capped per category and per country of chargeability, which generally follows an applicant’s country of birth rather than their current citizenship, so applicants with the same qualifications can face very different queues. In the October 2026 Visa Bulletin, the final action date for the second employment-based preference (EB-2) was 1 January 2025 for most chargeability areas, 1 October 2021 for mainland-China-born applicants and 1 November 2013 for India-born applicants: a gap of more than eleven years between India and the unlisted majority [30]. Applicants in other categories face different cut-offs, and the dates move from month to month, so the bulletin for the relevant month is the starting point for any individual case.

Canada’s Express Entry system [31] and Australia’s skilled-migration programmes [32] use criteria such as age, qualifications, language ability and work experience. Their selection mechanisms differ from the US system’s category and priority-date structure, but the comparison makes the same point: ease of entering as a visitor is not a reliable guide to eligibility for long-term immigration.

IV. When Immigration Becomes a Lottery

Some migration systems allocate a limited number of opportunities through random selection. A ballot can determine who gets the chance to apply, but it does not normally remove the programme’s eligibility requirements or guarantee final approval.

Case Study A: The US Diversity Immigrant Visa Program

The US Diversity Immigrant Visa Program uses a random selection process to distribute a limited number of opportunities for permanent immigration under Section 203(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The statute makes up to 55,000 diversity visas available each year, although a statutory set-aside of up to 5,000 visas for another programme (NACARA) reduces the number to about 50,000 [36]. Eligibility is limited to natives of countries with low recent immigration to the United States, which excludes countries that sent more than 50,000 immigrants in the previous five years, and applicants must have a high-school education or two years’ work experience in a qualifying occupation [36]. The programme is intended to broaden access for people from countries with historically lower levels of immigration to the United States.

Selection is not a guarantee of a visa. Selected applicants must complete the required application process, submit civil documents, undergo the relevant checks, attend an interview where required and obtain a visa number within the applicable fiscal-year limits. A selection therefore creates an opportunity, not an entitlement to enter or settle.

The programme has also been affected by administrative action. On 23 December 2025, the State Department paused all diversity visa issuance while it reviewed screening and vetting procedures; applicants could still file applications and attend interviews, but no visas were issued. Following a federal court order in Medani et al. v. Trump et al., the Department’s guidance, updated on 31 August 2026, states that as of 28 August 2026 the December 2025 pause is no longer in effect [12]. DV-2026 visas could not be issued after 30 September 2026, the end of the fiscal year [12]. A practitioner summary reports that a State Department cable of 10 September 2026 instructed consular posts to resume processing and issuance [12], but the sources reviewed do not say how many DV-2026 visas were issued before the deadline, so the pause’s practical effect on the 2026 cohort remains unquantified. The notice concerns administrative and litigation outcomes; it does not establish that the programme has been repealed or changed by statute.

Separately, the State Department announced in November 2025 that the DV-2027 registration start date would be published separately, while the visa application period for selected DV-2027 applicants would remain 1 October 2026 to 30 September 2027 [13]. As of 13 October 2026 that notice, last updated on 5 November 2025, still gave no registration dates, and reporting on 23 September 2026 confirmed that registration had not opened [13].

The programme illustrates how random selection can widen access to a limited immigration route while leaving eligibility and final approval requirements intact.

Case Study B: New Zealand’s Pacific Residence Ballots

New Zealand operates the Samoan Quota Scheme and the Pacific Access Category. Their annual ballots select eligible citizens of specified Pacific countries to be invited to apply for residence under the respective schemes administered by Immigration New Zealand [14]. Each scheme has its own quota and eligibility conditions, so the programmes should not be treated as a single, uniform ballot.

The Samoan Quota Scheme is open to eligible Samoan citizens. The Pacific Access Category covers eligible citizens of Tonga, Fiji, Kiribati and Tuvalu [14]. For 2026, Immigration New Zealand set the places at up to 1,100 Samoan citizens under the Samoan Quota and, under the Pacific Access Category, up to 250 Tongan, 250 Fijian, 75 Kiribati and 75 Tuvaluan citizens: 1,750 places in all [14]. Registration ran from 1 to 30 April 2026, the draw was scheduled for 20 May 2026, and the principal registrant had to be aged 18 to 45 on the closing date [14].

Selection in a ballot is not a grant of residence. Applicants must complete the relevant application and satisfy that scheme’s requirements, which may include conditions relating to age, employment, income, health and character. The requirements and deadlines must be checked separately for the Samoan Quota and each Pacific Access Category country.

Case Study C: The UK’s India Young Professionals Scheme Ballot

The UK’s India Young Professionals Scheme allocates a limited number of temporary work-and-residence visas to eligible Indian citizens through a ballot administered by the UK Home Office [15].

Winning the ballot allows an applicant to proceed with a visa application; it does not remove the programme’s eligibility requirements [15]. Applicants must be Indian citizens aged 18 to 30 with an eligible qualification and £2,530 in savings [15]. A successful applicant receives an invitation and has 90 days to apply online, prove their identity and provide documents; the application fee is £340 and is not refunded if the application is rejected, and a healthcare surcharge of £1,552 is also payable [15]. The visa lasts up to 24 months and cannot be extended [15].

Unlike the other examples, this ballot leads to an application for a temporary youth-mobility visa rather than a direct route to permanent settlement.

The Three Ballots Compared

Ballot	Who May Enter	What Selection Gives	What It Leads To
US Diversity Immigrant Visa	Natives of eligible countries with the required education or work experience [36]	An opportunity to apply for an immigrant visa [12]	Permanent immigration if the visa is issued within the fiscal year
New Zealand Samoan Quota and Pacific Access Category	Citizens of Samoa, Tonga, Fiji, Kiribati and Tuvalu; principal registrant aged 18 to 45 [14]	An invitation to apply for residence; 1,750 places in 2026 [14]	Residence, if the scheme’s requirements are met
UK India Young Professionals Scheme	Indian citizens aged 18 to 30 with an eligible qualification and £2,530 in savings [15]	An invitation to apply, with 90 days to do so [15]	A temporary visa of up to 24 months that cannot be extended [15]

V. The Passport Money Can Buy

Some countries offer residence or citizenship routes tied to qualifying investments or contributions. These programmes appeal to applicants seeking mobility or a different legal status, but they confer different rights and impose different conditions.

Residence by investment (RBI) grants permission to reside under the relevant programme. It does not, by itself, confer citizenship. Citizenship by investment (CBI) provides a route to apply for nationality under a programme’s rules, subject to approval and due diligence. The distinction matters because a residence permit, permanent residence and citizenship are not interchangeable outcomes.

Programme costs also extend beyond the advertised minimum. Applicants may face government fees, due-diligence charges, professional expenses and additional costs for family members. Any comparison should therefore identify what the headline amount covers, what status the programme grants and which conditions remain after approval.

Southern Europe: The Transition from Property to Regulated Capital

Portugal, Greece and Spain each operated investor-residence programmes, and their rules have since diverged. Portugal has shifted eligible investment away from real estate, Greece retains property-based routes with different thresholds by location and property type, and Spain ended its investor-visa route in 2025. The comparison is therefore not simply about minimum investment: it is about how governments define eligible capital, regulate residence and decide whether a programme should remain available.

• Portugal: The Residence Permit for Investment Activity (ARI) is administered by Portugal’s Agency for Integration, Migration and Asylum (AIMA). Qualifying routes now focus on capital transfers of at least €500,000 into non-real-estate investment funds, alongside research, cultural-support and job-creation routes with their own thresholds. Real-estate routes were removed under Law No. 56/2023, published in October 2023 [16]. Naturalisation is a separate legal process. Organic Law 1/2026, published on 18 May 2026 and in force from 19 May 2026, lengthened the required legal residence to 7 years for EU and Portuguese-speaking-country (CPLP) nationals and 10 years for others; applications filed before 19 May 2026 are assessed under the earlier rules [33]. Applicants must also meet the language, integration and criminal-record conditions applicable at the time of application.
• Greece: The Golden Visa framework is administered by the Ministry of Migration and Asylum. Under Law No. 5100/2024, published on 5 April 2024, qualifying real estate requires €800,000 in high-demand regions (Attica, Thessaloniki, Mykonos, Santorini and islands with more than 3,100 inhabitants) or €400,000 in other areas. A reduced threshold of €250,000 applies only to specified properties: non-residential buildings converted to residential use under the applicable conditions, and listed buildings undergoing restoration or reconstruction. The conversion must meet the relevant timing and certification requirements; the reduced threshold does not apply to every property conversion [17]. The thresholds apply together with the other conditions in the rules, including restrictions on short-term letting [17]. Naturalisation is separate from the investor residence permit and is subject to the applicable residence, language, civic-knowledge and other statutory requirements.
• Spain: The investor residence route, which included a €500,000 real-estate option per applicant, was ended by Organic Law 1/2025, published on 3 January 2025, with effect from 3 April 2025; applications submitted before that date continued under the earlier rules [18]. Ordinary naturalisation is a separate process under Spanish nationality law, with residence periods that vary by category of applicant.

The Eastern Caribbean: Regional Coordination

Citizenship-by-investment programmes operate in several Eastern Caribbean states, where eligible applicants can apply for nationality through approved contributions or other qualifying investments. The programmes differ in their options and conditions, while the revenue they generate has different fiscal significance across countries and years.

Regional coordination has become more important as these programmes face scrutiny over due diligence, marketing practices and international financial transparency. In a June 2024 release, the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States identified Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Saint Lucia as signatories to the regional memorandum of agreement. The states agreed that the minimum price for citizenship-by-investment options would be US$200,000 from 1 July 2024, and that discounting below the agreed minimum would be prohibited [19]. The agreement also addresses cooperation, information-sharing and common standards [19]. The existence of a regional commitment should nevertheless be distinguished from the implementation and enforcement of each programme’s domestic rules.

Comparative Framework of Selected Investment Migration Programmes

The table compares selected residence-by-investment programmes in Southern Europe with selected citizenship-by-investment programmes in the Eastern Caribbean. The headline amounts differ in what they purchase: some qualify an applicant for residence, while others support an application for citizenship. They may also cover different family sizes and investment structures, which the “Who the Amount Covers” column records, and the “Route Compared” column states whether the amount is a contribution, a fund investment or a property purchase. The comparison therefore concerns the legal status obtained, the financial threshold and the conditions attached, not a simple ranking from cheapest to most expensive. Each figure is the headline qualifying amount for the single route named in that row, not necessarily the lowest option the programme offers; government, processing and due-diligence fees are payable separately and are not included, and the amounts should be read alongside the applicable rules and the rule date shown for each row.

Jurisdiction	Route Compared	Headline Qualifying Amount for the Route Compared (excluding separately payable programme fees)	Who the Amount Covers	Status Granted	Official Source and Rule Date
Portugal	ARI, non-real-estate investment-fund route (one of several qualifying options)	€500,000	Main applicant; other ARI routes have different thresholds, some lower	Residence; naturalisation is a separate statutory process	AIMA ARI programme page; Law No. 56/2023, October 2023 [16]
Greece	Real-estate purchase	€800,000 (high-demand regions), €400,000 (other areas), or €250,000 (qualifying conversion to residential use completed after 5 April 2024 and before the permit application, or restoration or reconstruction of a listed building)	The qualifying property or properties; the treatment of co-owners and multiple applicants should be checked against the Ministry’s guidance	Residence; naturalisation is a separate statutory process	Law No. 5100/2024, Article 64, Government Gazette A’ 49, 5 April 2024; Ministry of Migration and Asylum guidance [17]
Spain	Investor residence route, closed	Formerly €500,000 (real-estate purchase)	Per applicant	Residence; route closed	Organic Law 1/2025, effective 3 April 2025 [18]
Saint Kitts and Nevis	Sustainable Island State Contribution (non-refundable contribution)	US$250,000	Main applicant or family of up to four	Citizenship application, subject to due diligence	Citizenship by Investment Unit, Sustainable Island State Contribution; official programme page, checked 13 October 2026 [20]
Saint Lucia	National Economic Fund (non-refundable contribution)	US$240,000	Family of up to four (applicant plus up to three qualifying dependants)	Citizenship application, subject to due diligence	Saint Lucia Citizenship by Investment Board, National Economic Fund; official programme page, checked 13 October 2026 [21]
Antigua and Barbuda	National Development Fund (non-refundable contribution)	US$230,000	Family of up to four	Citizenship application, subject to due diligence	Citizenship by Investment Unit, National Development Fund; official contribution and processing-fee schedule, checked 13 October 2026 [22]
Dominica	Economic Diversification Fund (non-refundable contribution)	US$200,000	Single applicant; US$250,000 for a main applicant and up to three qualifying dependants	Citizenship application, subject to due diligence	Citizenship by Investment Unit, Economic Diversification Fund; official programme page, checked 13 October 2026 [23]
Grenada	National Transformation Fund (non-refundable contribution)	US$235,000	Single applicant, couple or family of up to four	Citizenship application, subject to due diligence	Investment Migration Agency Grenada, National Transformation Fund; official programme page, checked 13 October 2026 [24]

Argentina: A Contested Naturalisation-by-Investment Route

Argentina’s 2025 decrees attempted to establish a naturalisation route based on a qualifying investment, without the ordinary residence period. Decree 366/2025 introduced the investment route into Law No. 346 and created the Agency of Citizenship by Investment Programmes. Decree 524/2025, published on 31 July 2025, provides that the Ministry of Economy will determine which investments qualify as “relevant” and sets out the procedure: applications go to the Agency within the Ministry of Economy, which assesses the investment and requests security and background reports before a recommendation reaches the national migration authority, which takes the final decision [7].

On 2 October 2026, the Ministry of Economy announced a programme intended to begin receiving applications in the fourth quarter of the year [8d]. At the time of the cited reporting, the operational details remained unresolved. Reporting on 7 October described two proposed options for the main applicant: a non-refundable contribution of US$350,000 or the purchase of a US$800,000 public bond, with lower amounts for spouses and children [8a, 8g, 8h]. These announced terms must be distinguished from operative eligibility rules: the decrees themselves do not establish those dollar thresholds [7, 8a].

The route’s legal status is contested. On 2 July 2026 the Ministerio Público Fiscal reported that the National Electoral Chamber had declared Decree 366/2025 null in a case about which authority decides naturalisation applications; that case concerned an ordinary naturalisation application, not an investment application [8b, 8e]. Reporting on 7 October said the government’s appeal had reached the Supreme Court [8c, 8e]. Separately, opposition legislators have introduced bills in the Chamber of Deputies to repeal the investment provisions [8e, 8f]. The consequences for the proposed programme therefore cannot be treated as settled. Neither the announcement nor an investment alone guarantees citizenship. The case also shows that birthright citizenship and routes to acquire nationality later in life are separate parts of a country’s legal framework.

The Legal Limits of Commodified Nationality: The CJEU Malta Judgment

The Court of Justice of the European Union ruled in 2025 (Commission v Malta, Case C-181/23, judgment of 29 April 2025) that Malta’s investor-citizenship scheme breached EU law [25]. The judgment treated the scheme as more than an ordinary exercise of national citizenship powers because nationality granted by a member state also confers EU citizenship and its associated rights. The Court’s analysis centred on the transactional character of the naturalisation procedure and on the obligations arising under Article 20 TFEU and Article 4(3) TEU [25].

The decision does not establish that every investment-migration programme everywhere is unlawful. Its implications depend on the scheme’s design and the applicable legal framework. The wider point is that nationality may be granted under national law, but its consequences can extend beyond the state that issues the passport.

VI. Beyond the Visa Desk: Displacement and Economic Spillovers

Restricted travel access is not the same as forced displacement, but the two can intersect. People fleeing conflict or persecution may have few safe and accessible ways to reach another country, while the rules governing admission can shape which routes remain available. Passport rankings alone cannot explain those journeys or determine who qualifies for protection. This section therefore treats displacement and the economic effects of migration as related consequences of unequal mobility, not as direct measures of visa exclusion.

Clarifying Legal Status in Forced Migration

Several legal categories must be distinguished because restricted travel access, migration and forced displacement are not the same thing:

• Visa Applicant: A person applying for permission to enter under a temporary or other immigration category.
• Asylum-Seeker: A person seeking international protection whose claim has not yet received a final determination.
• Refugee: A person who meets the applicable definition under the 1951 Refugee Convention or relevant regional or domestic law.
• Internally Displaced Person (IDP): A person forced to flee their home who remains within their country’s internationally recognised borders.

At the end of 2025, UNHCR reported 41.6 million refugees and other people in need of international protection, including Palestine refugees under UNRWA’s mandate, alongside 9 million asylum-seekers and 68.7 million people internally displaced by conflict or violence [26]. UNHCR estimated that 117.8 million people were forcibly displaced at the end of 2025, equivalent to about one in every 70 people worldwide [26]. These components sum to about 119.3 million, more than the headline total, partly because the categories overlap: UNHCR notes, for example, that internally displaced Palestine refugees appear in both the UNRWA and IDP figures but are counted only once in the overall total [26]. The categories should be read separately, using the agency’s reporting definitions, and should not be added.

A restricted passport does not automatically make an individual a refugee. People fleeing persecution or conflict may face limited options for reaching safety, while others use ordinary visa, family, study or employment routes. The extent to which visa restrictions influence irregular journeys varies by context and should be established through evidence about the routes people actually take.

Economic Dimensions: Remittances and Skilled Migration

Migration can affect origin countries through financial transfers, changes in the available workforce and the costs of training or replacing departing workers. These effects differ by country and occupation, so aggregate figures should not be treated as proof of a uniform outcome.

• Remittances: The World Bank’s personal-remittances indicator records approximately US$703.6 billion in receipts for low- and middle-income economies in 2025 [27]. The aggregate figure does not show how these receipts are distributed among households or used within recipient countries.
• Health-worker emigration: International recruitment can exacerbate shortages in countries with limited health-worker capacity. The effects depend on origin-country staffing, recruitment practices, remittances, return migration and replacement training, so stronger causal claims require country-specific evidence [28].

VII. Can the Lottery Be Changed?

Reforming passport inequality does not require assuming that borders should be open without conditions. It requires examining whether the rules governing movement are proportionate, transparent and consistent with the rights states recognise. Any reform must navigate competing concerns about sovereignty, equal dignity, security, economic policy and the reciprocal confidence on which travel privileges often depend:

• Sovereignty: States generally determine who may enter their territory and who may acquire their nationality, subject to applicable constitutional, treaty and other legal obligations.
• Equal Human Dignity: The moral position that an individual’s basic life prospects should not be dictated entirely by accidents of birth.
• Security and Administrative Capacity: The responsibility of governments to manage border integrity, verify traveller identity and plan public infrastructure.
• Economic Competition: The desire to attract international capital and skilled professionals while managing domestic housing and labour market considerations.
• The International Credibility of Passports: The recognition that visa-free privileges depend on reciprocal confidence in the issuing state’s screening standards.

The ballots and investment routes in Sections IV and V are best read as exceptions at the margin. The 2026 New Zealand ballots offer 1,750 places [14], the UK scheme leads only to a visa of up to two years that cannot be extended [15], and the investment routes are open only to applicants who can meet their financial thresholds. None of them changes the rules that assign the starting position, which is why the directions below concentrate on the transparency and accountability of those rules.

Practical Policy Directions

Policy proposals should be judged by their practical effects, not only by their stated aims. Useful tests include whether they reduce avoidable application costs, make decisions more predictable, protect legitimate security checks and provide applicants with meaningful ways to understand or challenge decisions.

• Consular Transparency: Publish processing-time ranges, document checklists, refusal grounds and accessible review procedures, while explaining legitimate security or privacy limits. Progress can be tested by whether median processing times are published by visa category and consular post.
• Global Skill Partnerships: Develop bilateral agreements that co-finance training, support retention in origin countries and monitor whether recruitment worsens shortages in essential services. The model was developed by the Center for Global Development, which proposes that destination countries fund training in origin countries for workers who can then migrate or stay [34]. Progress can be tested by workforce-retention outcomes in origin countries.
• Investment-Migration Oversight: Publish programme eligibility rules and fee schedules, require robust identity and source-of-funds checks, and provide for independent audits and information sharing where legally permitted. Progress can be tested by independently reported due-diligence compliance.
• Regional Free Movement: Evaluate regional agreements by their actual implementation, including entry rights, residence permits, work authorisation and access to complaint mechanisms, rather than by treaty commitments alone. Progress can be tested by published data on refused entries, permits issued and complaints resolved.

The gap between 192 destinations and 22 is not a complete measure of freedom, but it shows how sharply short-term travel access can differ by nationality. Birth shapes the initial legal position; visa rules determine which journeys are accessible; and financial resources may open routes unavailable to many others. These mechanisms confer different rights, and none guarantees entry or settlement everywhere.

A fairer mobility system need not eliminate borders or abandon eligibility rules. It should make those rules transparent, predictable and accountable, while distinguishing legitimate screening from avoidable barriers. The passport lottery persists because legal status is inherited unequally, entry is regulated unevenly, and the means of changing status are themselves unequally distributed.

VIII. References & Source Register

Numbers in square brackets in the text refer to the entries below. Each entry is labelled by one of four source types: primary legal authority (legislation, judgment, official notice); official implementation source (current programme rules, fee schedule, department guidance); official statistical source; or secondary interpretation (academic work, specialist indices, reporting). Where an entry relies on a secondary source for a point of law or a figure, it says so. Web addresses marked † were opened on 13 October 2026; the others are official site addresses from which the named document can be located. Programme rules and current figures are subject to change; the sources listed identify the applicable rules and should be consulted for any subsequent update.

1. Henley & Partners: The Henley Passport Index 2026. January 2026 edition: Singapore 192 destinations accessible without a prior visa, Afghanistan 24. July 2026 update (released 21 July 2026): Singapore 192, Afghanistan 22, a 170-destination gap. The July figures are confirmed by two press reports (The Star/ANN, 22 July 2026; Reuters via Aaj English TV, 24 July 2026); Henley’s public ranking page, opened on 13 October 2026, did not display the edition date or the scores. Figures refer to each edition’s stated methodology and reporting date. https://www.henleyglobal.com/passport-index †; https://www.thestar.com.my/aseanplus/aseanplus-news/2026/07/22/singapore-passport-ranked-worlds-most-powerful-again; https://english.aaj.tv/news/330464887 †. Secondary (specialist index and press reporting).
2. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division: International Migrant Stock 2024: Key Facts and Figures. Estimates 304 million international migrants in mid-2024, compared with 154 million in 1990. https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/. Official statistical.
3. GLOBALCIT: Global Database on Modes of Acquisition of Citizenship, European University Institute. Database. Comparative data on the legal rules for acquiring citizenship, including by birth. https://globalcit.eu. Secondary (academic dataset).
4. Carens, Joseph H.: “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders,” The Review of Politics 49, no. 2 (1987), pp. 251-273. The feudal-privilege comparison is cited at p. 252. Journal article. Secondary (academic).
5. Milanovic, Branko: “Global Inequality: From Class to Location, from Proletarians to Migrants,” Global Policy 3, no. 2 (2012), pp. 125-134. Examines the role of location and differences in national mean incomes in global inequality. Journal article. Secondary (academic).
6. Department of Justice Canada: Citizenship Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. C-29), Section 3, Justice Laws Website. Territorial birthright citizenship under subsection 3(1)(a); exceptions under subsection 3(2). https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-29/. Primary legal.
7. Government of Argentina: Decree 366/2025, 28 May 2025, and Decree 524/2025, 30 July 2025, Boletín Oficial de la República Argentina (https://www.boletinoficial.gob.ar). Decree 366/2025 amends the naturalisation framework (Law No. 346) to include relevant investment and creates the Agency of Citizenship by Investment Programmes. Decree 524/2025, published on 31 July 2025, delegates to the Ministry of Economy the determination of which investments are relevant and sets the procedure: application to the Agency, requests for reports from security and financial bodies, a recommendation to the national migration authority, and a decision by that authority within 30 working days. The procedural description was cross-checked against law-firm and press summaries of Decree 524/2025 (Bomchil, via abogados.com.ar, 31 July 2025, https://abogados.com.ar/decreto-5242025-nueva-via-para-obtener-la-ciudadania-argentina-por-inversion/37426; La Nación, 31 July 2025). Primary legal, with secondary summaries.
8. Argentina’s announced investment-citizenship programme and the legal challenge to Decree 366/2025. The announced programme terms and their legal status remain distinct from the text of the decrees. Official legal reporting and secondary reporting.
   • (a) Infobae, “Ciudadanía por inversión: las dudas que abre el nuevo plan del Gobierno según especialistas,” 7 October 2026, reporting the announced US$350,000 non-refundable contribution, US$800,000 public-bond option and expected fourth-quarter 2026 application start; the original page was not retrieved, and the same terms and expert commentary appear in (g) and (h).
   • (b) Ministerio Público Fiscal de la Nación, “Confirman que el fuero electoral es competente en cuestiones de ciudadanía,” 2 July 2026, reporting the National Electoral Chamber’s ruling declaring DNU 366/2025 null in the Yang, Liping s/nacionalidad y ciudadanía case; the original page was not retrieved, and the ruling is also described in (e).
   • (c) Infobae, “La Corte Suprema analizará otro DNU de Javier Milei que modificó el régimen para otorgar ciudadanías,” 7 October 2026, reporting that the government’s appeal had reached the Supreme Court; the original page was not retrieved, and the appeal is also described in (e).
   • (d) Perfil, “Nuevo programa de Ciudadanía argentina por Inversión: quiénes podrán solicitarla y cuánto deberán aportar,” October 2026, reporting the Ministry of Economy’s communiqué of 2 October 2026 announcing the programme in Paris, with applications to begin in the fourth quarter of 2026; the original page was not retrieved, and the Paris announcement is also reported in (g) and in Paula Carello, “Ciudadanía por inversión en Argentina: del anuncio a la implementación,” abogados.com.ar, https://abogados.com.ar/ciudadania-por-inversion-en-argentina-del-anuncio-a-la-implementacion-interrogantes-juridicos-e-institucionales/40233 †.
   • (e) Chequeado, “Ciudadanía argentina por inversión: de qué se trata el programa de Milei para extranjeros y por qué la Justicia lo cuestiona,” October 2026, https://chequeado.com/el-explicador/ciudadania-argentina-por-inversion-de-que-se-trata-el-programa-de-milei-para-extranjeros-y-por-que-la-justicia-lo-cuestiona/, explaining that the Electoral Chamber case concerned an ordinary naturalisation application and the competent authority, that the State’s appeal is before the Supreme Court, and that opposition deputies filed repeal bills.
   • (f) Diario Judicial, “La ciudadanía no es una inversión,” 5 October 2026, https://www.diariojudicial.com/news-104582-la-ciudadania-no-es-una-inversion, reporting a repeal bill introduced in the Chamber of Deputies.
   • (g) El Economista, “El Gobierno presentó en París un nuevo programa para obtener la ciudadanía argentina con una inversión mínima de US$ 350.000,” October 2026, https://eleconomista.com.ar/economia/argentina-permitira-obtener-ciudadania-cambio-inversiones-cuanto-costara-quienes-podran-obtenerla-n98585 †.
   • (h) Canal 12 Misiones, “Nación impulsa la ciudadanía por inversión y especialistas advierten dudas jurídicas, fiscales y migratorias,” October 2026, https://www.canal12misiones.com/nacionales/ciudadania-por-inversion-dudas-plan-nacion †, reporting the US$350,000 contribution and US$800,000 zero-rate bond options.
9. Federal Ministry of Justice, Germany: Nationality Act, Section 4(3), official English text. Sets the conditions for citizenship by birth for children born in Germany to non-German parents. https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stag/. The five-year parental residence period follows the 2024 amendment of the Act; the English translation reflects amendments only to a stated date, so the current German-language text (Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz) governs if the two differ. Primary legal.
10. Government of India: The Citizenship Act, 1955, Section 3, India Code (https://www.indiacode.nic.in; search “Citizenship Act, 1955”). Sets out citizenship by birth, including the periods beginning 26 January 1950, 1 July 1987 and 3 December 2004, and the exceptions under section 3(2), as the subsection now reads. Primary legal.
11. European Parliament and Council of the European Union: Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely, EUR-Lex. Articles 6, 7 and 16 on initial, extended and permanent residence rights; Article 21 TFEU. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32004L0038. Primary legal.
12. United States Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs: Diversity Visa Issuance Updated Guidance, 31 August 2026. States that, as of 28 August 2026, in accordance with the court’s order in Medani et al. v. Trump et al., the December 2025 pause of diversity visa issuance is no longer in effect. The pause itself was announced on 23 December 2025. The page as retrieved also repeats the December 2025 pause wording and its rationale beneath the update line; read with the update line and the court order, that wording describes the earlier pause. A practitioner summary reports a State Department cable of 10 September 2026 (26 STATE 88862) instructing posts to resume processing and issuance; none of the sources reviewed reports the number of DV-2026 visas issued. https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/News/visas-news/diversity-visa-issuance-updated-guidance.html †; Berry Appleman & Leiden, “State Department update on diversity visa issuance pause,” 2 September 2026, https://www.bal.com/immigration-news/united-states-state-department-update-on-diversity-visa-issuance-pause/; Erickson Immigration Group, “DOS Ends Diversity Visa Pause for 75 Countries,” https://eiglaw.com/dos-ends-diversity-visa-pause-for-75-countries/; Immigrationfleet, “DOS Updates Guidance on Diversity Visa and 75-Country Immigrant Visa Pauses,” https://immigrationfleet.com/?p=2939 †. Official implementation, with secondary summaries.
13. United States Department of State: Changes to Entry Period for 2027 Diversity Visa (DV) Program, 5 November 2025. Official notice. The notice states that DV-2027 registration dates will be announced separately and that the visa application period for selected applicants remains 1 October 2026 to 30 September 2027. As opened on 13 October 2026, the page was still marked last updated 5 November 2025 and gave no registration dates. https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/News/visas-news/changes-to-2027-dv-program-entry-period.html †. Courthouse News, “Green card lottery hangs in limbo as 2027 registration window shrinks,” 23 September 2026, reported that no registration date had been announced and that a lawsuit seeking to force registration was pending. https://courthousenews.com/green-card-lottery-hangs-in-limbo-as-2027-registration-window-shrinks/ †. Official implementation, with press report.
14. Immigration New Zealand: “The 2026 Pacific Access Category and Samoan Quota ballots open on 1 April 2026,” 18 March 2026, and “Pacific Access Category and Samoan Quota registrations are now open for 2026,” 1 April 2026. Official announcements. Confirm the 2026 places (up to 1,100 Samoan, 250 Tongan, 250 Fijian, 75 Kiribati and 75 Tuvaluan citizens), the registration period of 1 to 30 April 2026 and the draw date of 20 May 2026; the online registration page states that the principal registrant must be aged 18 to 45 on the closing date. https://www.immigration.govt.nz/about-us/news-centre/the-2026-pacific-access-category-and-samoan-quota-ballots-open-on-1-april-2026 †; https://www.immigration.govt.nz/about-us/news-centre/pacific-access-category-and-samoan-quota-registrations-are-now-open-for-2026 †; https://www.immigration.govt.nz/formshelp/pac-sq-registration †. One secondary summary reviewed (Envoy Global) gave different totals (650 and 1,650); the official announcements govern. Official implementation.
15. UK Home Office: India Young Professionals Scheme visa. Official guidance, page updated 9 September 2026. States that the visa is for Indian citizens aged 18 to 30 who are selected in the ballot, with an eligible qualification and £2,530 in savings; applicants have 90 days from the invitation email to apply; the application fee is £340 (not refunded if the application is rejected) and the healthcare surcharge is £1,552; the visa lasts up to 24 months and cannot be extended. https://www.gov.uk/india-young-professionals-scheme-visa †. Official implementation.
16. Agency for Integration, Migration and Asylum (AIMA), Portugal: Autorização de Residência para Investimento (ARI). Qualifying routes and thresholds, including the 500,000 euro fund and research routes, alongside cultural-support and job-creation routes; the regime as amended by Law No. 56/2023 of 6 October 2023, which closed the real-estate routes. https://aima.gov.pt. Official implementation and primary legal.
17. Hellenic Republic: Law No. 5100/2024, Article 64, Government Gazette A’ 49, 5 April 2024, amending Article 100 of Law No. 5038/2023. Official implementation sources: Ministry of Migration and Asylum, Golden Visa guidance (https://migration.gov.gr), and the National Registry of Administrative Public Services, Permanent golden visa (change of use), initial issuance. These sources support the 800,000, 400,000 and 250,000 euro thresholds, including the qualifying property-conversion route. The conditions attached to the 250,000 euro route (conversion completed after 5 April 2024 and before the permit application, engineer’s certificate, listed-building restoration or reconstruction) are taken from “The Greek Golden Visa after the 2024-2026 overhaul,” International Bar Association, https://www.ibanet.org/the-greek-golden-visa-after-2024-2026-overhaul †, which does not specify which instrument sets the detailed conditions; later implementing measures (Joint Ministerial Decision 214926/2025 and Ministry of Migration Circular 1/2026) are not relied on here. None of the sources reviewed is relied on for how the thresholds apply to co-owners or multiple applicants, which is left to the Ministry’s guidance. The short-term letting restriction relies on law-firm and trade commentary (Machas & Partners, Private Wealth 2026; Drakopoulos Law Firm, 9 September 2026; RE+D Magazine, 13 November 2025). Primary legal authority, official implementation and secondary legal commentary.
18. Kingdom of Spain: Ley Orgánica 1/2025, de 2 de enero, de medidas en materia de eficiencia del Servicio Público de Justicia, Boletín Oficial del Estado, 3 January 2025. Ends the investor residence route with effect from 3 April 2025; transitional provisions preserve applications submitted before that date. https://www.boe.es. Primary legal.
19. Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States: “Caribbean Countries Pressing Forward with the Implementation of the Memorandum of Agreement on Citizenship by Investment Programmes,” June 2024. Official release, with a link to the signed memorandum. Identifies all five signatories and states that the US$200,000 minimum price applies from 1 July 2024. https://www.oecs.int. Official implementation (regional organisation).
20. Citizenship by Investment Unit, Saint Kitts and Nevis: Sustainable Island State Contribution. Minimum contribution of US$250,000 for a main applicant or family of up to four members; additional dependants and due-diligence fees are listed separately. https://ciu.gov.kn. Page checked 13 October 2026. Official implementation.
21. Saint Lucia Citizenship by Investment Board: official programme site, National Economic Fund option. Minimum of US$240,000 for an applicant alone with up to three qualifying dependants; processing and due-diligence fees are listed separately. https://cip.gov.lc. Page checked 13 October 2026. The 2024 threshold memorandum is also reported by IMI Daily. Official implementation.
22. Citizenship by Investment Unit, Antigua and Barbuda: Schedule of fees. National Development Fund contribution of US$230,000 for a single applicant or family of up to four, with processing, due-diligence and passport fees listed separately. https://cip.gov.ag. Page checked 13 October 2026. Official implementation.
23. Citizenship by Investment Unit, Commonwealth of Dominica: Economic Diversification Fund. Contribution of US$200,000 for a main applicant and US$250,000 for a main applicant and up to three qualifying dependants, with processing, due-diligence, interview and certificate fees listed separately; see also the unit’s Investment Options page and the Citizenship by Investment Regulations 2024. https://cbiu.gov.dm. Pages checked 13 October 2026. Official implementation.
24. Investment Migration Agency, Grenada: Becoming a Citizen. National Transformation Fund contribution of US$235,000 for an individual applicant, a main applicant and spouse, or a family of four, with application, due-diligence, processing and interview fees listed separately. https://imagrenada.gd. Page checked 13 October 2026. The 2024 gazette notice is also reported by IMI Daily. Official implementation, with secondary report of the gazette notice.
25. Court of Justice of the European Union: Commission v Malta, Case C-181/23, judgment of 29 April 2025, ECLI:EU:C:2025:283. Official English judgment. The Court found that Malta’s investor-citizenship scheme breached Article 20 TFEU and Article 4(3) TEU. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62023CJ0181. Primary legal.
26. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Global Trends 2025 (released June 2026): Figures at a Glance and the Global Trends report. End-2025 figures: 41.6 million refugees, including people in refugee-like situations, other people in need of international protection and Palestine refugees under UNRWA’s mandate; 9 million asylum-seekers; 68.7 million internally displaced people; 117.8 million forcibly displaced overall. UNHCR notes that internally displaced Palestine refugees are counted in both the UNRWA and IDP figures but only once in the overall total. https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/2026-06/global-trends-report-2025.pdf †; https://www.unhcr.org/th/en/figure-at-a-glance †. Official statistical.
27. World Bank: Personal remittances received (current US dollars), Indicator BX.TRF.PWKR.CD.DT. The 2025 observation for the low- and middle-income aggregate is 703,649,276,037 US dollars, or approximately 703.6 billion US dollars (retrieved from the World Bank API on 13 October 2026). https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.CD.DT; https://api.worldbank.org/v2/country/LMY/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.CD.DT?format=json †. Official statistical.
28. World Health Organization: Health workforce: Migration. Summarises evidence on international health-worker migration, including the risk that recruitment from countries facing health-worker shortages can weaken their health systems, and describes WHO’s work on ethical recruitment and safeguards. https://www.who.int (Health workforce topic pages). Official institutional source.
29. Government of Argentina: Ley 346 de Ciudadanía (1869), Article 1, official consolidated text on argentina.gob.ar. Article 1(1) makes Argentine all persons born in the territory, whatever the nationality of their parents, except the children of foreign ministers and members of a legation resident in the Republic; Article 1(2) covers children of native Argentines born abroad who opt for Argentine nationality. https://www.argentina.gob.ar/normativa/nacional/ley-346-48854/texto †. Primary legal.
30. United States Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs: Visa Bulletin (monthly), travel.state.gov. Employment-based and diversity categories, priority dates and country-specific cut-offs. https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/visa-law0/visa-bulletin.html. The October 2026 final action dates for EB-2 (1 January 2025 for all chargeability areas except those listed, 1 October 2021 for mainland-China-born, 1 November 2013 for India) are taken from reproductions of the bulletin’s chart (University of Texas Southwestern international affairs page, https://www.utsouthwestern.edu/about-us/administrative-offices/international-affairs/immigration-updates/october-2026-visa-bulletin.html †) and are consistent with practitioner summaries (Colombo Hurd, https://www.colombohurdlaw.com/?p=32858 †; Alma, https://www.tryalma.com/learn/october-2026-visa-bulletin †). Official implementation, with secondary reproduction.
31. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC): Express Entry and the Comprehensive Ranking System. https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/immigrate-canada/express-entry.html. Official implementation.
32. Australian Government Department of Home Affairs: Skilled Migration Program. https://immi.homeaffairs.gov.au. Official implementation.
33. Portugal, Lei Orgânica n.º 1/2026, de 18 de maio, which amends and republishes the Nationality Law (Lei n.º 37/81), Diário da República, 1.ª série, n.º 95 (address as given by Migalhas: https://diariodarepublica.pt/dr/detalhe/lei-organica/1-2026-1123539996). Published 18 May 2026 and in force from 19 May 2026; naturalisation after 7 years’ legal residence for EU and CPLP nationals and 10 years for other nationalities; applications filed before 19 May 2026 continue under the earlier rules. The Diário da República text itself is not quoted here; the dates and periods are taken from consistent secondary reports: Migalhas, “Nova lei da nacionalidade de 2026: O que realmente mudou,” 10 August 2026, https://www.migalhas.com.br/depeso/459450/nova-lei-da-nacionalidade-de-2026-o-que-realmente-mudou †; Cidadania é Visto, https://www.cidadaniaevisto.com.br/blog/nova-lei-nacionalidade-portuguesa-2026 †; Canaydin, https://canaydin.av.tr/has-potugal-citizenship-increased-from-5-to-10-years/ †; and Sovereign Group, “Portugal brings new Nationality Law into force: longer residence but less uncertainty,” 2026, https://www.sovereigngroup.com/news/portugal-tightens-naturalisation-rules-doubles-residency-requirement/ †. Primary legal (identified), with secondary reports.
34. Center for Global Development: Global Skill Partnerships (policy proposal developed by Michael Clemens and colleagues). Describes bilateral training-and-mobility agreements in which destination-country funding supports skills training in the origin country. https://www.cgdev.org. Secondary (policy research).
35. United Nations General Assembly: Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Article 13(2); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), Article 12(2) and (4). Recognise the right to leave any country, including one’s own, and to return to one’s own country; neither instrument confers a general right to enter another state. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights; https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights. Primary legal (international instruments).
36. United States Code: Immigration and Nationality Act, Section 203(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(c). Diversity immigrants: annual limit of 55,000, subject to a set-aside of up to 5,000 visas for NACARA; eligibility limited to natives of countries with low recent admission rates (excluding countries that sent more than 50,000 immigrants in the previous five years); high-school education or two years’ qualifying work experience. https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title8-section1153. The statutory text was not opened on 13 October 2026; the figures are stated from the statute as generally reported and should be checked against the current text. Primary legal.